Ms R. Siewert  
Senator for Western Australia  
Parliament House, Canberra  
senator.siewert@aph.gov.au  

Dear Ms Siewert  

Re: Strengthened Healthcare Identifiers (HI) legislation  

The Australian Privacy Foundation (APF) is the country's leading privacy advocacy organisation. I attach a brief backgrounder.  

I am writing in my capacity as Chair of the Health Sub Committee of the APF.  

The APF was pleased to note privacy concerns expressed about the breadth of the Healthcare Identifiers Bill currently before the Senate identified by some members of the Community Affairs Committee in their March 2010 minority report on the HI legislation.  

People are being fed self-serving propaganda by health authorities and a handful of health informatics professionals with a vested interest in massive expenditures on new IT systems. The federal government continues to drip-feed limited information about the identifier to the public with no coherent and transparent analysis, architecture or governance frameworks. The needs of Australian consumers and patients do not seem to matter at all. The major privacy concerns identified in three successive Privacy Impact Assessment Reports have been largely ignored.  


The APF is concerned the legislation will enable an expensive Identifier “white elephant” that contributes nothing to the improved patient care outcomes that
can be expected from sensible decentralised Electronic Health Record implementations.

We believe that the Health Identifier Bill should not be authorised by the Parliament. Instead, the Government should be forced to focus efforts and funding on actual improvements to health, rather than on what the Canberra bureaucracy and some ICT systems suppliers want.

Yours sincerely

Juanita Fernando
Chair, Health Sub Committee
Australian Privacy Foundation

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Contact Details for the APF and its Board Members are at:
http://www.privacy.org.au/About/Contacts.html
Australian Privacy Foundation

Background Information

The Australian Privacy Foundation (APF) is the primary national association dedicated to protecting the privacy rights of Australians. The Foundation aims to focus public attention on emerging issues that pose a threat to the freedom and privacy of Australians. The Foundation has led the fight to defend the right of individuals to control their personal information and to be free of excessive intrusions.

The APF’s primary activity is analysis of the privacy impact of systems and proposals for new systems. It makes frequent submissions to parliamentary committees and government agencies. It publishes information on privacy laws and privacy issues. It provides continual background briefings to the media on privacy-related matters.

Where possible, the APF cooperates with and supports privacy oversight agencies, but it is entirely independent of the agencies that administer privacy legislation, and regrettably often finds it necessary to be critical of their performance.

When necessary, the APF conducts campaigns for or against specific proposals. It works with civil liberties councils, consumer organisations, professional associations and other community groups as appropriate to the circumstances. The Privacy Foundation is also an active participant in Privacy International, the world-wide privacy protection network.

The APF’s Board comprises professionals who bring to their work deep experience in privacy, information technology and the law.

The following pages provide access to information about the APF:
• submissions http://www.privacy.org.au/Papers/
• resources http://www.privacy.org.au/Resources/
• media http://www.privacy.org.au/Media/
• Board-members http://www.privacy.org.au/About/Contacts.html

The following pages outline several campaigns:
• the Australia Card (1985-87)
  http://www.privacy.org.au/About/Formation.html
• the Medicare Smart Card (2004-06)
• the Human Services Card (2005-06)
• the Australia Card Mark II (2005-06)
• the ‘Access Card’ (2006-07)
This document builds on the APF’s submissions over the last two decades, and particularly during the last three years, in order to consolidate APF’s policy position. It presents a concise statement of general Principles and specific Criteria to support the assessment of proposals for eHealth initiatives and eHealth regulatory measures.

The first page contains headlines only, and the subsequent pages provide further explanation.

**General Principles**

1. Health Care Must Be Universally Accessible
2. The Health Care Sector is by its Nature Dispersed
3. Personal Health Care Data is Inherently Sensitive
4. The Primary Purpose of Personal Health Care Data is Personal Health Care
5. Other Purposes of Personal Health Care Data are Secondary, or Tertiary
6. Patients Must Be Recognised as the Key Stakeholder
7. Health Information Systems are Vital to Personal Health Care
8. Health Carers Make Limited and Focussed Use of Patient Data
9. Data Consolidation is Inherently Risky
10. Privacy Impact Assessment is Essential

**Specific Criteria**

1. The Health Care Sector Must Remain a Federation of Islands
2. Consolidated Health Records Must Be the Exception not the Norm
3. Identifiers Must Be at the Level of Individual Applications
4. Pseudo-Identifiers Must Be Widely-Used
5. Anonymity and Persistent Pseudonyms Must Be Actively Supported
6. All Accesses Must Be Subject to Controls
7. All Accesses of a Sensitive Nature Must Be Monitored
8. Personal Data Access Must Be Based Primarily on Personal Consent
9. Additional Authorised Accesses Must Be Subject to Pre- and Post-Controls
10. Emergency Access Must Be Subject to Post-Controls
11. Personal Data Quality and Security Must Be Assured
12. Personal Access and Correction Rights Must Be Clear, and Facilitated
General Principles

1. **Health Care Must Be Universally Accessible.** Access to health care must not be conditional on access to health care data or on demonstration of the person’s status (such as residency rights or level of insurance).

2. **The Health Care Sector is by its Nature Dispersed.** Health care is provided by thousands of organisations and individual professionals, each with a considerable degree of self-responsibility. The sector is far too large, and far too complex to be centrally planned. Instead it must be managed as a large, complex and highly de-coupled system of autonomous entities, each of which is subject to regulation by law, Standards and Codes.

3. **Personal Health Care Data is Inherently Sensitive.** Many individuals have serious concerns about the handling of at least some categories of health care data about themselves. Their willingness to divulge important information is important to their health care, but is dependent on them having confidence about how that information will be managed.

4. **The Primary Purpose of Personal Health Care Data is Personal Health Care.** The protection of the individual person is the primary function of personal health care data and systems that process it. The key users of that data are health care professionals.

5. **Other Purposes of Personal Health Care Data are Secondary, or Tertiary.** Public health is important, but is a secondary purpose. Administration, insurance, accounting, research, etc. are neither primary nor secondary but tertiary uses. The tail of health and public health administration and research must not be permitted to wag the dog of personal health care.

6. **Patients Must Be Recognised as the Key Stakeholder.** Government agencies and corporations must directly involve people, at least through representatives of and advocates for their interests, in the analysis, design, construction, integration, testing and implementation of health information systems.

7. **Health Information Systems are Vital to Personal Health Care.** People want systems to deliver quality of service, but also to be trustworthy, transparent and respectful of their needs and values. In the absence of trust, the quality of data collection will be greatly reduced.

8. **Health Carers Make Limited and Focussed Use of Patient Data.** Health care professionals do not need or want access to their patients’ complete health records, but rather access to small quantities of relevant information of assured quality. This requires effective but controlled inter-operability among health care data systems, and effective but controlled communications among health care professionals. Calls for a general-purpose national health record are for the benefit of tertiary users (administration, insurance, accounting, research, etc.), not for the benefit of personal health care.

9. **Data Consolidation is Inherently Risky.** Physically and even virtually centralised records create serious and unjustified risks. Services can be undermined by single points of failure; health care data isn’t universally understandable but depends on context; consolidation produces a ‘honey pot’ that attracts break-ins and unauthorised secondary uses and creates the additional risk of identity theft; and diseconomies of scale and scope exceed economies.

10. **Privacy Impact Assessment is Essential.** Proposals relating to personal health care data and health care information systems must be subject to PIA processes, including prior publication of information, consultation with affected people and their representatives and advocates, and publication of the outcomes of the study. Designs for systems and associated business processes must be based on the results of the PIA, and implementations must be rejected if they fail to embody the required features.
Specific Criteria

1 **The Health Care Sector Must Remain a Federation of Islands.** The health care sector must be conceived as islands that inter-communicate, not as elements of a whole. Health care information systems must be conceived as independent services and supporting databases that inter-operate, not as part of a virtually centralised database managed by the State. Coordinating bodies must negotiate and facilitate inter-operability, not impose central schemes.

2 **Consolidated Health Records Must Be the Exception not the Norm.** A small proportion of the population may benefit from linkage of data from multiple sources, primarily patients with chronic and/or complex conditions. Those patients must be the subject of consent-based, specific-purpose data consolidation. This activity must not apply to people generally.

3 **Identifiers Must Be at the Level of Individual Applications.** Each of the large number of dispersed health care information systems must use its own identifier for people. A system-wide or national identifier might serve the needs of tertiary users of personal data, but does little for the primary purpose of personal care, and it creates unnecessary risks for individuals.

4 **Pseudo-Identifiers Must Be Widely-Used.** Particularly when personal data moves between organisations, the maximum practicable use must be made of one-time-use and other forms of pseudo-identifiers, in order to keep people’s identities separate from the data itself, and minimise the risk of personal health care data escaping and being abused.

5 **Anonymity and Persistent Pseudonyms Must Be Actively Supported.** Anonymity is vital in particular circumstances such as ensuring that people are treated for sexually transmitted diseases. Persistent pseudonyms are vital in particular circumstances such as for protected witnesses, victims of domestic violence, and celebrities and notorieties who have reason to be concerned about such threats as stalking, kidnapping and extortion.

6 **All Accesses Must Be Subject to Controls.** Access to personal data must be subject to controls commensurate with the circumstances, including the sensitivity of the data and the potential for access and abuse of access. This requires identification of the category of person and in many cases of the individual who accesses the data, and authentication of the category or individual identity. However, the barriers to access and the strength of authentication must balance the important value of personal privacy and effective and efficient access by health care professionals.

7 **All Accesses of a Sensitive Nature Must Be Monitored.** Non-routine accesses and accesses to particularly sensitive data must be detected, recorded, and subject to analysis, reporting, sanctions and enforcement.

8 **Personal Data Access Must Be Based Primarily on Personal Consent.** The primary basis for access to personal data is approval by the person concerned. Consent may be express or implied, and may be written, verbal or non-verbal, depending on the circumstances. All accesses based on consent must be detected, recorded and subject to analysis, reporting, investigation, sanctions and enforcement.

9 **Additional Authorised Accesses Must Be Subject to Pre- and Post-Controls.** All accesses that are not based on personal consent must be the subject of explicit legal authority that has been subject to prior public justification. All such accesses must be detected, recorded and subject to analysis, reporting, investigation, sanctions and enforcement.

10 **Emergency Access Must Be Subject to Post-Controls.** Health care professionals (but only health care professionals) must have the practical capacity to access data in apparent violation of the personal consent principle, but must only do so where they reasonably believe that it is necessary to prevent harm to some person. All such accesses must be detected, recorded, reported and subject to analysis, investigation, sanctions and enforcement.

11 **Personal Data Quality and Security Must Be Assured.** Data must be of a quality appropriate to its uses, and retained only as long as it remains relevant. Personal data in storage, in transit, and in use, must be subject to security controls commensurate with its sensitivity, and with the circumstances.

12 **Personal Access and Correction Rights Must Be Clear, and Facilitated.** Each person must have access to data about themselves, and access must be facilitated by any organisation that holds data that can be associated with them. Where appropriate, the access may be intermediated, in order to avoid misunderstandings and misinterpretation of the data. Where data is not of appropriate quality, the person must be able to achieve corrections to it.
Personal health data is by its nature highly sensitive, so unauthorised access and disclosure is of even greater concern than it is with other categories of data. Irrespective of what laws and norms might apply to data breaches generally, it is vital that clear and effective protections exist for personal health care data. The APF has accordingly adopted the following policy on the matter.

A data breach occurs when personal health care data is exposed to an unauthorised person, and there is a reasonable likelihood of actual or perceived harm to an interest of the person to whom the data relates.

1. **An organisation that handles personal health care data must:**
   - (a) take such steps to prevent, detect and enable the investigation of data breaches as are commensurate with the circumstances
   - (b) conduct staff training with regard to security, privacy and e-health
   - (c) subject health care data systems to a programme of audits of security measures
   - (d) when health care data systems are in the process of being created, and when such systems are being materially changed, conduct a Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA), in order to ensure that appropriate data protections are designed into the systems, and to demonstrate publicly that this is the case

2. **Where grounds exist for suspecting that a data breach may have occurred, the organisation responsible must:**
   - (a) investigate
   - (b) if a data breach is found to have occurred, take the further steps detailed below
   - (c) document the outcomes
   - (d) publish information about the outcomes, at an appropriate level of detail

3. **Where a data breach has occurred, the organisation responsible must:**
   - (a) promptly advise affected individuals (and/or their next of kin or carers)
   - (b) provide an explanation and apology to affected individuals
   - (c) where material harm has occurred, provide appropriate restitution
   - (d) publish an appropriate notice and explanation in a manner that facilitates discovery and access by people seeking the information
   - (e) advise the Office of the Federal Privacy Commissioner

4. **Where a serious data breach has occurred, the Office of the Federal Privacy Commissioner must:**
   - (a) review the outcomes of any investigation undertaken by the responsible organisation
   - (b) where any doubt exists about the quality, conduct its own independent investigation
   - (c) publish the results of the review and/or investigation
   - (d) add the details of the data breach to a publicly available register, including any decision made as the result of the investigation, in order to ensure that information is available to support informed public debate about protections for personal health care data

5. **Where a data breach occurs that results in material harm, the affected individuals must** have recourse to remedies, both under the Privacy Act and through a statutory cause of action